Dossier - Semana 39

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Semana 39 – 25 de septiembre al 1 de octubre de 2017

Preserving Spain Preserving Spain Sep 30, 2017 Ana Palacio Catalonia’s proposed independence referendum on October 1 threatens to mire Spain in a constitutional crisis, and could give added momentum to the wave of ethno-nationalism and nativism sweeping Europe and North America. Spain’s next move could decide the fate of its own democratic system, as well as others across the Western world. MADRID … Leer más.

The Who, Where, and When of Secession The Who, Where, and When of Secession Sep 29, 2017 Joseph S. Nye National self-determination, the principle that US President Woodrow Wilson put on the international agenda in 1918, is generally defined as the right of a people to form its own state. The independence referendums in Iraqi Kurdistan and Catalonia are the latest examples showing why that principle is … Leer más.

Do Kurds Have the Right to Self-Determination and/or Secession? Do Kurds Have the Right to Self-Determination and/or Secession? by Milena Sterio On September 25, 2017, Kurds voted in a self-declared independence referendum organized by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). , According to the referendum results, it appears that about 78 per cent of Kurds actually participated in the referendum and that nearly 93 per cent of participants voted in … Leer más.

Anuario 2017 en Relaciones Internacionales Anuario 2017 en Relaciones Internacionales PRESENTACIÓN GENERAL Leer más Departamentos Africa ARTICULOS Relevancia de la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea que excluye al Sáhara Occidental del acuerdo de libre comercio entre la UE y Marruecos Luz Marina Mateo  Leer más África en la agenda externa de la administración Macri (junio 2016 – junio 2017) Carla Morasso  … Leer más.

Trump’s UN Hypocrisy Trump’s UN Hypocrisy Sep 28, 2017 Christopher R. Hill US President Donald Trump’s tone in his maiden address to the United Nations was that of a dissatisfied tenant, blaming the landlord for his home’s poor state of repair. But the UN is only as good as those who inhabit it, not least the US itself. DENVER – US President Donald … Leer más.

Comunicado de expertos de Naciones Unidas a España sobre medidas tomadas de cara a referéndum en Cataluña y Derechos Humanos Comunicado de expertos de Naciones Unidas a España sobre medidas tomadas de cara a referéndum en Cataluña y Derechos Humanos Foto extraída de nuestra nota publicada en HablandoClaro (Radio Columbia) titulada: “Referéndum en Cataluña: a propósito de la carta colectiva de profesores de derecho internacional” Este 28 de setiembre, expertos de Naciones Unidas han hecho un vehemente llamado a España … Leer más.

El ‘sí’ gana el referéndum kurdo en Irak con un 92% El ‘sí’ gana el referéndum kurdo en Irak con un 92% El primer ministro iraquí exige a Erbil que anule el resultado de la consulta, que tuvo una participación del 72,16%, y advierte de que, si no, no habrá negociación El 92,73 % de los votantes en el referéndum del Kurdistán iraquí el pasado lunes dieron su sí a la … Leer más.

Cómo mejorar el NAFTA Cómo mejorar el NAFTA Sep 26, 2017 JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA ,  CARLOS HEREDIA CIUDAD DE MÉXICO – De acuerdo a lo prometido por el presidente de los Estados Unidos Donald Trump, ha comenzado la renegociación del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (NAFTA, por su sigla en inglés). Y las conversaciones iniciales ya están enviando un mensaje claro: los desacuerdos a … Leer más.

Dossier - Semana 39Derecho Internacional Público - www.dipublico.org

El Parlamento Europeo aconseja no pasar a la fase dos del Brexit

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El Parlamento Europeo aconseja no pasar a la fase dos del Brexit

El calendario del Brexit empieza a quedar obsoleto. A falta de un milagro —en palabras del presidente de la Comisión Europea, Jean-Claude Juncker— que acelere la negociación, Bruselas y Londres no podrán pasar a la segunda fase del proceso en octubre, como pretendían. El Parlamento Europeo quiere adelantarse al próximo mensaje de la primera ministra británica, Theresa May, para pedir que no se abra el segundo capítulo de esta historia: la discusión sobre cómo se relacionará Reino Unido con la Unión Europea una vez abandone el club.

La Eurocámara tiene previsto aprobar el próximo martes una resolución que pide a los jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la UE aplazar la discusión sobre el futuro trato con Londres. El texto, al que ha tenido acceso EL PAÍS, alude a las dificultades para avanzar en la llamada factura del Brexit y concluye: “La ausencia de propuestas claras ha obstaculizado las negociaciones”. Pese al destello optimista que dejó la última ronda de negociación, los eurodiputados ven casi imposible despejar las incógnitas pendientes antes de la cumbre de octubre y piden a los mandatarios europeos “que pospongan su evaluación sobre si se ha progresado suficientemente”.

La Eurocámara ha medido los tiempos parlamentarios de forma que su mensaje se emita el 3 de octubre, justo un día antes de la intervención de May en la conferencia anual de su partido. Es muy probable que la líder británica quiera alardear de progresos con sus todavía socios comunitarios para tratar de legitimarse ante sus correligionarios. La resolución del Parlamento tratará de agrietar esa valoración.

Salvo sorpresas, el texto tiene garantizada la mayoría porque cuenta con el respaldo de Partido Popular Europeo, de socialistas, liberales, izquierda minoritaria y verdes. No lo apoyarán el grupo de conservadores que engloba a los tories, a los europarlamentarios polacos de Kaczynski y a los nacionalistas flamencos ni tampoco el grupo capitaneado por el populista británico Nigel Farage. Esas formaciones trabajan en una resolución alternativa, sin visos de prosperar.

La Eurocámara, cuyo voto es vinculante para el acuerdo final del Brexit aunque no participa directamente en la negociación, ha adoptado la postura más intransigente en este proceso. Los eurodiputados cargan las tintas sobre los derechos de los ciudadanos afectados por la ruptura. La resolución considera “vital” concretar el compromiso, adquirido por May, de incorporar a la ley británica el acuerdo alcanzado con Bruselas. Y se muestra inflexible respecto a la línea roja del Tribunal de Justicia de la UE. Solo esta instancia, según el Parlamento, puede garantizar los derechos de los europeos que permanezcan en suelo británico y de los británicos que sigan residiendo en la UE.

Lucía Abellán

Bruselas 30 SEP 2017 – 05:43 ART

[via Portada de Internacional | EL PAÍS]

El Parlamento Europeo aconseja no pasar a la fase dos del BrexitDerecho Internacional Público - www.dipublico.org

El ‘sí’ gana el referéndum kurdo en Irak con un 92%

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El ‘sí’ gana el referéndum kurdo en Irak con un 92%

El primer ministro iraquí exige a Erbil que anule el resultado de la consulta, que tuvo una participación del 72,16%, y advierte de que, si no, no habrá negociación

El 92,73 % de los votantes en el referéndum del Kurdistán iraquí el pasado lunes dieron su sí a la independencia de esa región autónoma, según ha anunciado este miércoles la Comisión Electoral. El esperado éxito choca con un aumento de la presión de Bagdad sobre el Gobierno regional al que ha pedido que anule el resultado de la consulta y entregue el control de sus dos aeropuertos internacionales. Las autoridades kurdas han rechazado tal posibilidad.

“Sobre los 3.305.925 votos emitidos, el sí ha obtenido el 92,73 % y el no un 7,27 %”, señala el comunicado de la Comisión. De acuerdo con la misma fuente, el total de potenciales electores en Kurdistán, las áreas administradas y la diáspora fue de 4.581.255 de personas, un millón menos de la cifra que había circulado con anterioridad al referéndum. A la inexistencia de un censo propiamente dicho, se unía la dificultad de calcular cuántos residentes de las “zonas en disputa” y kurdos en el exterior podían votar.

Nada de eso importa para el Gobierno central de Irak o para los países vecinos, vehementemente opuestos a la consulta y que temen que la eventual independencia de la región autónoma tenga un efecto contagio entre sus propias minorías kurdas. El presidente kurdo, Masud Barzani, ha subrayado que el triunfo del sí no significaría una secesión inmediata, sino el inicio de “negociaciones serias” con Bagdad para resolver los puntos de fricción (“zonas en disputa” y petróleo) y consensuar la separación.

Sin embargo, el primer ministro iraquí, Haider al Abadi, condiciona el diálogo a la anulación previa de los resultados. Al Abadi, que al año que viene afronta elecciones legislativas, se ve presionado no sólo desde la oposición, sino incluso por su propio bloque político al frente de cuya ala más dura se encuentra su predecesor, Nuri al Maliki. El Parlamento, reunido sin la presencia de los diputados kurdos que han boicoteado la sesión, ha pedido al primer ministro, como jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas, que envíe tropas para proteger a la población a las zonas que se disputan los gobiernos central y regional, y en especial a Kirkuk para recuperar los pozos de petróleo (en manos de los kurdos desde 2014).

En lo que parece un aviso hacia Erbil, la capital kurda, una delegación del Ejército iraquí ha viajado este miércoles al vecino Irán para coordinar esfuerzos militares. El gesto se produce al día siguiente de que soldados iraquíes se unieran a unas maniobras de las Fuerzas Armadas turcas en la frontera común. Tanto Teherán como Ankara han amenazado con sanciones al Gobierno kurdo si sigue adelante con el proceso de independencia.

Bagdad está intentando utilizar a su favor la oposición internacional al referéndum. De momento ha dicho que va a pedir a los gobiernos extranjeros que cierren sus misiones diplomáticas en Kurdistán. Además, las aerolíneas Middle East Airlines, de Líbano, y Egypt Air, de Egipto, han anunciado que dejarán de volar a Erbil, a partir del viernes cuando se cumple el plazo de 72 horas que el Gobierno iraquí dio a las autoridades kurdas para entregar el control de los aeropuertos de esa ciudad y de Suleimaniya.

“No entendemos cómo entregarles los dos aeropuertos. Ya están sujetos a la Dirección de Aviación Civil iraquí”, ha declarado el ministro de Transportes kurdo, Mowlud Murad.

La amenaza de cerrar el espacio aéreo a los vuelos internacionales también ha sido cuestionada por el Departamento de Estado norteamericano. “No sería un ejemplo diálogo constructivo”, ha dicho un portavoz. Observadores occidentales en Irak estiman que Bagdad está “reaccionando de forma exagerada”, tras el respaldo obtenido en durante la Asamblea General de la ONU en Nueva York, y expresan dudas de que por ese camino vayan a lograr algún avance.

Ángeles Espinosa

Dubái 27 SEP 2017 – 19:00 CEST

[via Portada de Internacional | EL PAÍS]

El ‘sí’ gana el referéndum kurdo en Irak con un 92%Derecho Internacional Público - www.dipublico.org

Preserving Spain

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Preserving Spain

Sep 30, 2017 Ana Palacio

Catalonia’s proposed independence referendum on October 1 threatens to mire Spain in a constitutional crisis, and could give added momentum to the wave of ethno-nationalism and nativism sweeping Europe and North America. Spain’s next move could decide the fate of its own democratic system, as well as others across the Western world.

MADRID – Nothing brings concerned friends out of the woodwork like a crisis. That has certainly been the case with the current situation in Spain, where Catalonia has called a referendum on independence for October 1. Among the many messages of support I have received in recent weeks, there have been more than a few inquiries as to why Spain does not simply allow the referendum to play out. But that is not an option.

The idea that Catalonia should be able to hold its referendum, under the principle of the “right to decide” (derecho a decidir), has been raised in the international press, and even gained traction among some segments within Spain. Many have cited former British Prime Minister David Cameron’s decision to allow Scotland’s independence referendum to take place in 2014.

But such a process is illegal under the Spanish constitution of 1978. That constitution marked the country’s passage from dictatorship to democracy and provides the framework for Spain’s rule-of-law system. And, as it explicitly states, it is “based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation,” with sovereignty belonging “to the Spanish people.”

In short, Spain is one nation, indivisible. As such, a referendum on secession cannot legally proceed without crippling the constitutional order that the country has built over the last 40 years, since the death of the dictator Francisco Franco in 1975.

It must be emphasized, however, that the principle that Spain is and must remain one unified country does not in any way preclude the existence of individual or group identities. On the contrary, the constitution’s preamble includes a pledge to protect the human rights, culture, traditions, languages, and institutions of the “peoples of Spain.”

From this pledge has developed a complex body of law granting regional autonomy, including, in particular, for Catalonia, with significant powers having been transferred to the Catalonian regional government. The calibration of this relationship among group, region, and nation is a difficult and ongoing process, but it is occurring within the context of an overarching constitutional system. A referendum on independence would shatter that system.

Some claim that the answer is to change the constitution to allow for such an independence referendum. But, though calls for such a change will surely grow louder, it would be sheer folly to heed them. Doing so would not only defy the will of an overwhelming majority of Spanish citizens; it could also strike a fatal blow to Spanish democracy itself.

The democratic Spanish state, based on the idea of one Spanish nation comprising all of Spain’s peoples, is modern, pluralistic, and flexible. It has strengthened an interdependence stemming from our collective experience and shared history. Facilitating the divisibility of this idea of Spain will hasten the advance of the type of nationalism and nativism that has been on the rise elsewhere in Europe and North America. Permitting votes on secession is not a democratic act; it is an attack on democracy.

But preventing an unconstitutional referendum is only the first step toward protecting Spanish democracy; Spain must also determine how to move forward from October 1. The choices it makes will not only determine its future democratic vibrancy; they will also provide an indication of how other liberal democracies, faced with many of the same forces that are at play on the streets of Barcelona (Catalonia’s regional capital), may proceed.

If Spain is to remain one nation, that nation must be manifest throughout Spanish society. And, here, there is much work to be done.

One of the consequences of Catalonia’s growing autonomy, and the misuse of that autonomy by identitarian separatists in the regional government, has been the withdrawal of the Spanish state from the region. The connections between state and citizen have become increasingly distant, leading to the loosening of the social bonds that hold the nation together.

A similar phenomenon has occurred in the rest of Spain and, indeed, across the West. This is not due to regional separatism, but rather to citizens’ growing sense of disconnection from the functioning of the state. The relationship between people and their government has taken on a dynamic that increasingly resembles that of customers and service providers.

What is needed in Spain today is a concerted effort to reengage society – particularly younger generations – with the project of government. My generation came of age during the transition to democracy (La Transición), a process to which one could not help but feel tied.

La Transición, however, has in some ways become a victim of its own success, as that era and those who lived through it have continued to dominate Spain’s political consciousness. This has created a generational cleavage that can be seen in the Catalonia debate within the Spanish Socialist Party: while the old guard staunchly defends Spain’s constitutional order, the party’s younger members have taken a more ambiguous position. It is crucial to connect with this new generation in a process that is not passive, but instead involves daily engagement.

Throughout its history, Spain has vacillated between leading and lagging. Sometimes what happens in Spain presages developments elsewhere; other times, Spain merely feels the aftershocks of faraway events. The situation in Catalonia, needless to say, fits into the former category.

The challenge of deepening the connections among citizens, states, and society is universal. And, given the temptation to revert to ethno-nationalism or tribalism – which, as we have lately seen in mature democracies, directly threatens liberalism and the rule of law – it is also urgent.

In Spain, we have our work cut out for us. But if we can get this right, our country – and democracy more generally – will be the better for it.

Ana Palacio

 

Ana Palacio, a former Spanish foreign minister and former Senior Vice President of the World Bank, is a member of the Spanish Council of State, a visiting lecturer at Georgetown University, and a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on the United States.

[via Project Syndicate]

Preserving SpainDerecho Internacional Público - www.dipublico.org

Nicaragua / Colombia: Colombia presenta Contramemoria a la Corte Internacional de Justicia

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Nicaragua / Colombia: Colombia presenta Contramemoria a la Corte Internacional de Justicia

Este 28 de setiembre, Colombia procedió a depositar formalmente a la Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ) su documento escrito (contramemoria) en respuesta a una de las dos nuevas demandas presentadas en su contra por Nicaragua en el año 2013 (véase comunicado de prensa del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia reproducido al final de esta nota).

Como se recordará, Nicaragua ha presentado dos nuevas demandas contra Colombia en el 2013. Una primera alegando que Colombia amenazó con recurrir a la fuerza a Nicaragua, y una segunda sobre la posibilidad de extender más allá de 200 millas marítimas su plataforma continental en el Caribe. Pese a cuestionar la competencia de la CIJ, presentado Colombia para ambas demandas una serie de excepciones preliminares, la CIJ se declaró plenamente competente en su decisión de marzo del 2016, permitiendo que el procedimiento sobre el fondo continúe sin mayor dilación en ambas demandas (véase al respecto nuestra breve nota publicada en el sitio Ius360).

En aquel momento, el Presidente calificó la decisión de la CIJ de declararse competente como “algo injurioso” para Colombia (véase video de la Agencia Andes), anunciando posteriormente que Colombia optaría por no comparecer más ante la CIJ (véase video de Cablenoticias). Nos permitimos concluir en aquella ocasión nuestro análisis de marzo del 2016 de la siguiente manera: “A la hora de redactar estas breves líneas, no queda claro si Colombia tiene claridad sobre la estrategia que está siguiendo desde el 2012 ante las pretensiones de Nicaragua. Su aparato estatal está exhibiendo ante los ojos del mundo un espectáculo raramente visto, con un lenguaje corporal inédito en los anales de la justicia internacional (que posiblemente sea explotada por los hábiles asesores de Nicaragua)“.

— Comunicado del MRREE de Colombia con fecha del 28/09/2017 —

Comunicado sobre los avances en la defensa de Colombia en el caso ‘Cuestión de la Delimitación de la Plataforma Continental entre Nicaragua y Colombia más allá de las 200 millas náuticas desde la costa nicaragüense’28/09/2017

• En cumplimiento del cronograma establecido por la Corte Internacional de Justicia, el Gobierno presentó hoy 28 de septiembre (12 p.m. hora de La Haya – 5 a.m. hora de Colombia) el documento por medio del cual Colombia respondió todos y cada uno de los puntos y argumentos planteados por Nicaragua en el proceso sobre la ‘Cuestión de la Delimitación de la Plataforma Continental entre Nicaragua y Colombia más allá de las 200 millas náuticas desde la costa nicaragüense’.

• La presentación se da en cumplimiento de los plazos establecidos por la Corte luego de que esta se declarara competente para el caso y no significa que hoy se haya tomado ninguna decisión frente a este caso.

• En el proceso la Corte tiene que decidir si puede proceder a realizar una delimitación de la plataforma continental, es decir el subsuelo marino, más allá de las 200 millas náuticas desde la costa nicaragüense. Así mismo, si Nicaragua tiene o no los derechos que alega.

• La Contramemoria es un documento en el cual Colombia responde, punto por punto y argumento por argumento, los alegatos planteados en la Memoria que Nicaragua entregó a la Corte.

• De conformidad con las reglas y prácticas de la Corte, los documentos sometidos a consideración de la Corte son de carácter confidencial y, por consiguiente, no es posible revelar su contenido hasta que se abra la fase oral del proceso judicial. No obstante, el Gobierno Nacional se permite informar a los colombianos que se sometieron a la Corte argumentos científicos, jurídicos e institucionales indicando las razones por las cuales esta no puede proceder con una delimitación como lo pretende Nicaragua. Su reclamación de una supuesta plataforma continental extendida no tiene ningún fundamento y Colombia demostró que tiene plena e indiscutible titularidad sobre el área marítima reclamada por Nicaragua.

• El Gobierno Nacional continúa defendiendo con firmeza la integridad del Archipiélago de San Andrés, Providencia y Santa Catalina, y los derechos de Colombia en el mar Caribe.

Bogotá, septiembre 28 de 2017

[via Derecho Internacional Público. Costa Rica]

Nicaragua / Colombia: Colombia presenta Contramemoria a la Corte Internacional de JusticiaDerecho Internacional Público - www.dipublico.org

Comunicado de expertos de Naciones Unidas a España sobre medidas tomadas de cara a referéndum en Cataluña y Derechos Humanos

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Comunicado de expertos de Naciones Unidas a España sobre medidas tomadas de cara a referéndum en Cataluña y Derechos Humanos

Foto extraída de nuestra nota publicada en HablandoClaro (Radio Columbia) titulada: “Referéndum en Cataluña: a propósito de la carta colectiva de profesores de derecho internacional“

Este 28 de setiembre, expertos de Naciones Unidas han hecho un vehemente llamado a España a respetar los derechos de los ciudadanos, de cara al referéndum previsto para este 1ero de octubre del 2017, y declarado ilegal por las autoridades españolas. Con relación a aspectos jurídicos, tanto de carácter constitucional como internacional, remitimos al lector a nuestra breve nota publicada en el portal de Ius360.

Ante la negativa de la Generalitat de desconvocar la consulta, pese a haber sido declarada ilegal desde el pasado 7 de setiembre por el juez constitucional español, la tensión se ha incrementado en los últimos días, con movilizaciones de diversos sectores de la sociedad catalana favorables al “derecho a decidir” en las urnas su futuro. Las autoridades catalanas han procedido a reimprimir boletas decomisadas por las autoridades españolas, a reemplazar las urnas interceptadas por las autoridades por otras confeccionadas en los últimos días, y a crear sitios distintos a los desactivados por orden de la justicia española conteniendo información sobre los centros de votación. Estas y otras actuaciones se dan en medio de acciones legales contra algunas de las medidas decididas por las autoridades españolas.

Los expertos en derechos humanos de Naciones Unidas señalan, entre otros puntos, que

“Las medidas que estamos presenciando son preocupantes porque parecen violar derechos individuales fundamentales, limitando el flujo de información pública y la posibilidad de un debate abierto en un momento crítico para la democracia española“.

El pasado 23 de setiembre, fue la ONG Amnistía Internacional la que hizo ver en un comunicado que, además de cuidar el tono de sus declaraciones, las autoridades españolas debían resguardar y proteger los derechos a la libertad de expresión y a manifestarse de forma pacífica.

Mientras que desde Ginebra se circuló el comunicado de Naciones Unidas, desde Bruselas fueron las autoridades catalanas las que explicaron ante medios de prensa internacionales convocados para la ocasión que la jornada electoral se realizará pese a todas las acciones llevadas a cabo por España para impedirla: véase nota de prensa sobre declaraciones de Raul Romeva en Bruselas.

El uso del derecho penal para frenar las pretensiones de las autoridades catalanas (citación de alcaldes catalanes a declarar ante la Fiscalía, intercepción y decomiso del material previsto para las urnas, desactivación ordenada por la justicia española de los sitios que informan a los electores, penalización de quiénes son llamados a formar parte de las mesas electorales, entre otras medidas) constituye una peligrosa opción de las actuales autoridades españolas, renuentes a cualquier negociación política con las máximas autoridades de Cataluña en los últimos años.

A continuación se reproduce textualmente el comunicado circulado por la Oficina del Alto Comisionado para los Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas (versión en español y en inglés), 48 horas antes de la consulta que la Generalitat ha convocado y mantenido como tal para este próximo Domingo 1ero de octubre.

España debe garantizar el respeto a derechos fundamentales en su respuesta al referéndum catalán

GINEBRA (28 de septiembre de 2017) – Dos expertos de las Naciones Unidas* exhortaron a las autoridades españolas a garantizar que las medidas adoptadas antes del referéndum catalán del 1 de octubre no interfieran con los derechos fundamentales a la libertad de expresión, reunión y asociación y participación pública.

El gobierno catalán ha programado un referéndum sobre la independencia de la comunidad autónoma para el 1 de octubre. Sin embargo, el Tribunal Constitucional de España decidió el 6 de septiembre que el referéndum sería inconstitucional.

“Independientemente de la legalidad del referéndum, las autoridades españolas tienen la responsabilidad de respetar los derechos que son esenciales para las sociedades democráticas”, dijeron los expertos.

Desde la sentencia, cientos de miles de catalanes han salido a la calle para protestar. Las tensiones han aumentado, con las autoridades registrando casas de imprenta y confiscando materiales electorales. Varios sitios web relativos al referéndum han sido bloqueados y las reuniones políticas al respecto han cesado.

Diferentes personajes políticos han sido arrestados, al tiempo que los dirigentes de las protestas masivas han sido acusados de sedición, un crimen que conlleva una pena máxima de 15 años de prisión.

“Las medidas que estamos presenciando son preocupantes porque parecen violar derechos individuales fundamentales, limitando el flujo de información pública y la posibilidad de un debate abierto en un momento crítico para la democracia española”, señalaron.

El 21 de septiembre, más de 4.000 agentes de policía fueron desplegados en la región autónoma, con una orden del Gobierno de ‘actuar en caso de que se celebrara el referéndum ilegal’.

“Nos preocupa que esta orden y la retórica que la acompaña puedan aumentar las tensiones y el malestar social”, dijeron los expertos.

“Instamos a todas las partes a ejercer la mayor moderación y a evitar actos violentos de cualquier tipo en el contexto de las protestas pacíficas que se den en los próximos días”, concluyeron.

Los expertos han estado en contacto con el Gobierno de España con respecto a la situación.

FIN

(*) Los expertos: el Sr. David Kaye, Relator Especial sobre la promoción del derecho a la libertad de opinión y expresión y el Sr. Alfred de Zayas, Experto Independiente sobre la promoción de un orden internacional democrático y equitativo.

Spain must respect fundamental rights in response to Catalan referendum, UN rights experts

GENEVA (28 September 2017) – UN experts* have called on the Spanish authorities to ensure that measures taken ahead of the Catalan referendum on 1 October do not interfere with the fundamental rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association, and public participation.

The Catalan government has scheduled a referendum on independence for the autonomous region for 1 October. However, the Constitutional Court of Spain decided on 6 September that the referendum would be unconstitutional.

“Regardless of the lawfulness of the referendum, the Spanish authorities have a responsibility to respect those rights that are essential to democratic societies,” the experts said.

Since the ruling, hundreds of thousands of Catalans have taken to the streets in protests. Tensions have escalated, with the authorities searching print houses and seizing referendum material. Websites have been blocked, and political meetings stopped.

Politicians have been arrested, and leaders of the mass protests have been charged with sedition, a crime which carries a maximum sentence of 15 years imprisonment.

“The measures we are witnessing are worrying because they appear to violate fundamental individual rights, cutting off public information and the possibility of debate at a critical moment for Spain’s democracy.”

On 21 September, more than 4,000 police officers were deployed to the autonomous region, with an order from the Government to “act in case the illegal referendum takes place”.

“We are concerned that this order and the accompanying rhetoric may heighten tensions and social unrest,” the experts said.

“We urge all parties to exercise the utmost restraint and avoid violence of any kind to ensure peaceful protests in the coming days”, they concluded.

The experts have been in contact with the government of Spain concerning the situation.

ENDS

(*) The experts: Mr. David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and Mr. Alfred de Zayas, Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order.

[via Derecho Internacional Público. Costa Rica]

Comunicado de expertos de Naciones Unidas a España sobre medidas tomadas de cara a referéndum en Cataluña y Derechos HumanosDerecho Internacional Público - www.dipublico.org

The Kampala Amendments on the Crime of Aggression Before Activation: Evaluating the Legal Framework of a Political Compromise

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The Kampala Amendments on the Crime of Aggression Before Activation: Evaluating the Legal Framework of a Political Compromise

by Astrid Reisinger Coracini

[Astrid Reisinger Coracini is is Lecturer at the University of Salzburg and Director of the Salzburg Law School on International Criminal Law, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law (SLS). This is the first of a two-part post on the subject.] 

In December 2017, the Assembly of States Parties of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court will hold its sixteenth session with the ‘activation of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression’ on its agenda. Almost twenty years after the crime of aggression was included within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court as one of the four core crimes and seven years after the adoption of a ‘provision on the crime of aggression’ in accordance with article 5(2) of the Rome Statute (hereinafter all articles refer to the Rome Statute, unless otherwise clarified), the Review Conference’s determination to activate this jurisdiction ‘as early as possible’ (preambular paragraph 6 of Resolution 6) will be put to a test. Once the ‘decision to be taken after 1 January 2017’ (common para. 3 of Arts. 15bis and 15ter) will have been reached, the Court will be able to exercise jurisdiction ‘with respect to crimes of aggression committed one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty States Parties’ (common para. 2 of Arts. 15bis and 15ter), a temporal condition that was met on 26 June 2017.

In preparation of its upcoming session, the Assembly established ‘a facilitation, based in New York, open only to States Parties, to discuss activation of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression’ (ICC-ASP/15/Res.5, annex I, para. 18(b)). The activation decision is a mere procedural step. However, given the continuing unease voiced by a few States, the facilitation seems to also provide a platform for discussions on substance. This post will address arguments that were presented during the facilitation process by academic experts, Prof. Dapo Akande, Prof. Roger Clark, Prof. Kevin Heller, and Prof. Noah Weisbord. Considering that the current discussion has narrowed down to the question of the Court’s jurisdictional reach, so will this post.

1. The Kampala compromise

Notwithstanding the two temporal conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (entry into force of a minimum number of ratifications and the activation decision), the Kampala compromise is embedded in the jurisdictional regime of the Rome Statute. Following a referral by the Security Council of the United Nations, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 13(b) (Art. 15ter). Following a referral by a State party to the Rome Statute or a proprio motu investigation by the prosecutor, the preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction as defined in Art. 12 apply (Art. 15bis referring to Art. 13(a) and (c)), albeit with two restrictions.

First, Art. 12 only applies in situations involving ‘a crime of aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State Party has previously declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar’ (Art. 15bis(4)). In other words, the Court may not exercise jurisdiction over an act of aggression committed by a non-State party or committed by a State party that has previously opted-out.

Second, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by nationals or on the territory of a non-State party (Art. 15bis(5)). Accordingly, the exercise of jurisdiction is further excluded over any crime of aggression arising from an act of aggression committed against a non-State party as well as over any non-State party national contributing to a crime of aggression over which the Court otherwise could exercise its jurisdiction. As part of the compromise reached in Kampala, States parties further decided that the provision on aggression shall enter into force only for those States that ratify or accept the amendments (in accordance with Art. 121(5)). A more detailed analysis can be found here, here, and in this Chart.

The conditions for the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression allow for broad exceptions from the Court’s default jurisdictional regime. Those regarding non-States parties are absolute exceptions and unprecedented in the general jurisdictional regime of the Statute. Those regarding States parties are less expansive but still represent serious deviations from Part 2 of the Statute. The exceptions were strongly criticised, for being too far-reaching as well as for not being sufficiently far-reaching, for establishing a different jurisdictional regime relating to States parties that do not accept the amendments on the one hand and to non-States parties on the other hand, or for establishing a third jurisdictional regime different from Part 2 of the Statute and from Art. 121(5). Still, they represent the compromise that was negotiated in good faith and adopted by consensus in Kampala in 2010. It is a compromise that determines who should be covered by the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, which has so far been ratified by 34 States parties, and on the basis of which an opt-out declaration has once been lodged.

2. Does the political compromise of Kampala include application of Art. 121(5) second sentence?

A preliminary note on the meaning of Art. 121(5) second sentence: the overwhelming view holds that Art. 121(5) second sentence establishes a distinct jurisdictional regime for crimes covered by an amendment when committed by nationals or on the territory of a State party that does not accept that amendment. Art. 121(5) second sentence is not directed at non-States parties. The Court’s jurisdictional reach over nationals and the territory of non-States parties remains governed by Part 2 of the Statute and any deviation thereto would require a formal amendment (States should therefore refrain from eroding Part 2 through an enabling resolution). But Art. 121(5) second sentence provides a privileged position for States parties regarding the Court’s jurisdiction over amended crimes. I have argued elsewhere that this provision should be interpreted systematically and in light of the object and purpose of the Statute to not have such a wide scope. The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court, which is ‘limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’ (Art. 5(1)), sets a high threshold for amendments. Either a crime is generally accepted to fulfil this criterion and warrants inclusion in the Statute, or it does not and should consequently not be the subject of an amendment. If all crimes equally fulfil this criterion, it is debateable why the sole fact of a later inclusion should submit ‘amended most serious crimes’ to a different jurisdictional regime. Applying two different jurisdictional regimes leads to particularly odd results in the interpretation of the ‘Belgian amendments’ that expand war crimes in the context of a non-international armed conflict. The Court’s jurisdictional reach over the same conduct includes nationals and the territory of States parties when it is committed in the context of an international armed conflict. When it is committed in the context of a non-international conduct, the Court’s reach over nationals or the territory of States parties that have not (yet) accepted the amendment is excluded. The precluded reach over ‘territory’ deprives a non-accepting State party from the protection it otherwise enjoys in the context of an international armed conflict. The precluded reach over ‘nationals’ seems to privilege foreign fighters that join an organized armed group in a fight against governmental authorities. They would be exempt from the Court’s reach, whereas members of the regular armed forces (which under the same constellation would internationalize the conflict) could be prosecuted by the Court. For these reasons, I uphold my previous position, but this interpretation remains a minority view and was not further discussed or acted upon during the negotiations on the crime of aggression. The Kampala compromise is without doubt based on the generally accepted interpretation of Art. 121(5) second sentence. This post will therefore proceed on this basis.

The main controversial issue is currently whether Art. 121(5) second sentence applies to the aggression amendments. To answer this question, it is fundamental to first establish whether the application or non-application of that provision is part of the compromise adopted in Kampala.

A textual interpretation of Art. 15bis and 15ter suggests that the jurisdictional regime established for the crime of aggression differs and partly directly contradicts Art. 121(5) second sentence. First, Art. 15bis and 15ter foresee different conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction for different trigger mechanisms. Art. 121(5) second sentence applies to all trigger mechanisms; at least in the ordinary meaning of its words. Second, Art. 15bis defines an absolute exception to the exercise of jurisdiction over crimes committed by nationals or on the territory of non-States parties. Art. 121(5) second sentence does not exclude the exercise of jurisdiction with regard to non-States parties and it was argued that the main purpose of the provision was not to open such an exception, but instead to privilege States parties and thus provide an incentive for non-States parties to join the Statute. Third, Art. 15bis is based on the assumption that nationals and the territory of States parties that do not accept an amendment are within the Court’s jurisdictional reach. Art. 121(5) second sentence is generally interpreted to provide the contrary. Fourth, a State party that opts-out in accordance with Art. 15bis is still be protected by the Court’s jurisdictional reach as a victim of an act of aggression. Art. 121(5) second sentence on the other hand does not concern itself with State acts and would provide for the same limited jurisdictional regime for aggressor States and their victims.

The aggression amendments do not only constitute a compromise in substance. A major component of the Kampala compromise was to establish agreement on the question of which of the three available amendment mechanisms was to be applied. This also included the question of how the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction were to be consolidated with the consequences that these mechanisms may provide. The possibility that a compromise may not include Art. 121(5) second sentence had been discussed in detail prior to Kampala. The travaux préparatoires of Kampala provide clear evidence that the non-applicability of Art. 121(5) second sentence was part of the negotiations leading to the compromise. This is particularly underlined by the explanation of position by the delegation of Japan, criticizing ‘cherry picking’ from the relevant provisions of the Statute from a legal point of view.

Finally, it would be incomprehensible why States should have invested in lengthy and arduous negotiations to find a compromise if its essence would subsequently be reversed by way of an amendment procedure. It is therefore understood that the reference to article 121(5) in operative para. 1 of Resolution 6, in the context of the expressions ‘adoption, in accordance with Art. 5(2)’ and ‘shall enter into force in accordance with Art. 121(5)’, must be read as referring to the entry into force leg of article 121(5), namely its first sentence.

3. Does the non-application of Art. 121(5) second sentence violate the Statute?

Having established that the non-applicability of Art. 121(5) second sentence was part of the political compromise reached in Kampala, the key question remains whether this was lawfully so.

In order to address this question, it is necessary to recall the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute, which were themselves the result of a compromise that allowed removing the brackets around the crime of aggression during the final days of the Rome Conference. Accordingly, the crime of aggression falls within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court, but the Court shall only exercise its jurisdiction once a provision would be adopted, in accordance with articles 121 and 123, defining the crime and setting out the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction thereover (Art. 5(1)(d) and Art. 5(2)).

The mandate of Art. 5(2) has generally been interpreted as giving the negotiators wide discretion in order to agree upon a provision on the crime of aggression. That includes that the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression might differ from the general jurisdictional regime established in the Statute. On the procedural level, Art. 5(2) refers to ‘adoption’ in accordance with Art. 121 at a review conference (Art. 123). This reference is indisputably imprecise and it has therefore generated three readings: (i) that a provision on the crime of aggression merely required adoption in accordance with Art. 121(3); (ii) that it required adoption and entry into force in accordance with Art. 121(4); and (iii) that it required adoption and entry into force in accordance with Art. 121(5).

It is inherent in the vagueness of Art. 5(2) that all three readings may be legally substantiated or criticised. However, the decision taken in Kampala renders these competing arguments obsolete. The question today is not anymore, which argument is the strongest one (and therefore merits reflection in the compromise decision). The question today is rather whether the decision taken in Kampala can be reasonably argued within the legal framework of the Statute. Against this background, the provisions of the Statute may support different justifications, which are not mutually exclusive, on the non-applicability of Art. 121(5) second sentence to the provision on the crime of aggression; a position that was expressed in academia and that was supported by a majority of States in the negotiation process.

The Kampala compromise has its foundation in the Art. 5(1) and Art. 12(1) ‘jurisdiction’ argument. Art. 5(1) clearly provides that the crime of aggression falls within the jurisdiction of the Court. This understanding is emphasised by Art. 12(1), which provides that States parties accept the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, including over the crime of aggression, upon acceptance or ratification of the Statute. The crime of aggression has a specific position, insofar, as it was expressly listed in the Statute at the time of its adoption. Since the Court’s jurisdiction was already accepted by all States parties, it may be argued that the provision on the crime of aggression does not require further acceptance.

The Art. 5(2) ‘adoption’ argument comes to a similar result. It contends that the aggression amendments are based on Art. 5(2) and require mere adoption in accordance with Art. 121(3). This view was supported by some States during the negotiation process. In Kampala, this minority view was joined by a large number of States that shared arguments based on the specific position of the crime of aggression within the Statute but would not accept a solution without an entry into force mechanism. Under the premise not to be bound by either Art. 121(4) or 121(5), the Kampala conference consequently agreed on an individual entry into force of the amendments in accordance with (and as provided by) the first sentence of Art. 121(5).

According to the Art. 5(2) ‘conditions’ argument, Art. 121(5) may in principle apply to the aggression amendments, albeit subject to the mandate provided by Art. 5(2). Given the broad authority to define specifically the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction of the crime of aggression in the mandate of Art. 5(2), it is not convincing that the drafters would have been mandated to override conditions prescribed in Part 2 with regard to the crime of aggression but would be limited by conditions foreseen in Art. 121(5) second sentence.

All these elements were part of debates before and in Kampala and helped pave the way for the compromise. They were reflected in the decision of the review conference ‘to adopt’ the provision on aggression ‘in accordance with article 5, paragraph 2’.

[via Opinio Juris]

The Kampala Amendments on the Crime of Aggression Before Activation: Evaluating the Legal Framework of a Political CompromiseDerecho Internacional Público - www.dipublico.org

Trump’s UN Hypocrisy

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Trump’s UN Hypocrisy

Sep 28, 2017 Christopher R. Hill

US President Donald Trump’s tone in his maiden address to the United Nations was that of a dissatisfied tenant, blaming the landlord for his home’s poor state of repair. But the UN is only as good as those who inhabit it, not least the US itself.

DENVER – US President Donald Trump’s first address to the United Nations General Assembly will be remembered, above all, for its bizarre language, and its descriptions of North Korea as “depraved,” Iran as “murderous,” and Cuba and Venezuela as “corrupt.” And, beyond calling out miscreant member states by name, Trump also offered a fervent defense of his “America First” agenda.

But while Trump’s particular choice of words was new to the UN, his arguments were not. He pointed out, with some justification, that other countries also put their own national interests first. And he reprised a longstanding complaint within US foreign-policymaking circles: that it is somehow excessive and unfair to expect American taxpayers to pay for 22% of the UN’s total budget.

After calling on the General Assembly to do its part to implement and then enforce sanctions against North Korea, Trump said, “Let’s see how they do.” But referring to the UN as “they” implies that it is something apart from the US. Trump’s tone was that of a dissatisfied tenant, blaming the landlord for his home’s poor state of repair. But the UN is only as good as those who inhabit it, not least the US itself.

In his speech, Trump listed America’s many contributions to the world, and suggested that it keeps the UN around as a sort of favor to other countries in need of an international forum. He assumed no US responsibility for the UN’s fortunes, failures, or even its achievements. But, in addition to contributing more than any other country to the UN budget, the US also plays an outsize role within the institution. The US can thus claim credit for many of the UN’s successes; but it is also responsible for many of its failures.

It is worth remembering that no UN secretary-general assumes office without US support. And, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the US has veto power over any UN action, including sanctions, deployments of peacekeepers, and official condemnations of other member states. Even if the UN’s large institutional bureaucracy can be unwieldy at times, its effectiveness ultimately depends on its most influential members.

Consider the Bosnian conflict in the early 1990s, when the Security Council decided to send in UN peacekeepers, rather than deploying a more robust multilateral presence, as would have been allowed under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The United Kingdom and France, which contributed the bulk of the peacekeeping force, insisted on a peacekeeping mandate, because they did not want to put their troops in harm’s way.

The US, for its part, refused to contribute any troops at all, and thus had no right to call for a stronger mandate that would have allowed UN forces to step in to end the violence. Although many Americans had witnessed the carnage from their living rooms and wanted the UN to do more to stop it, neither they nor their leaders – first George H.W. Bush and then Bill Clinton – had any interest in sending American troops to be a part of a Bosnian peacekeeping force. The result, as we now know, was that the killing continued, sometimes in the presence of UN peacekeepers whose countries had not given them a strong enough mandate to intervene.

By the time the US-led Dayton Accords had put an end to the war, in December 1995, the UN’s peacekeeping capacity had been so thoroughly discredited that NATO war-fighting troops were sent in to take over from the UN Protection Force. In other words, when the situation required war fighters, peacekeepers were dispatched; and when the situation called for peacekeepers, war fighters were sent. None of this apparent dysfunction had anything to do with the UN. It was a direct result of UN member states’ decision-making.

Even Trump’s dystopian and dyspeptic speech conceded that the UN makes valuable contributions to world peace, through peacekeeping missions and other forms of assistance. More often than not, this work is done in far-flung countries, where direct US involvement would be unpalatable to many American politicians’ constituents.

The UN is far from perfect. But, rather than bash it, American leaders, starting with Trump, should understand that its actions and decisions are often an extension of their own.

Christopher R. Hill

Christopher R. Hill, former US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, was US Ambassador to Iraq, South Korea, Macedonia, and Poland, a US special envoy for Kosovo, a negotiator of the Dayton Peace Accords, and the chief US negotiator with North Korea from 2005-2009. He is currently Dean of the Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, and the author of Outpost.

[via Project Syndicate]

Trump’s UN HypocrisyDerecho Internacional Público - www.dipublico.org